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NOTES
of federal relief prompted the court to conclude that Congress
did not intend to establish a general scheme authorizing the
Board to award full compensatory damages for injuries sus-
tained due to wrongful conduct. 44 Thus, the provision for back
pay, being only incidental to the primary purpose of Congress
to stop and prevent unfair labor practices, does not preempt re-
covery in the field of damages for conduct which may be the
basis for a tort or breach of contract action.
The two instant cases evidence a balance struck by the Court
between the individual's rights and those of the union. The
Laburnum requisites were met in that Congress had not pro-
vided an adequate remedy and state courts are therefore not
precluded from exercising jurisdiction. 45 These two cases, com-
bined with the Laburnum decision, reflect the Court's change of
attitude regarding federal preemption in the field of labor re-
lations by virtue of the Labor Management Act. Earlier deci-
sions invalidated state action only remotely in conflict with the
act.46 Further, the Court had held in the past that the existence
of gaps in the remedial legislation was no license for the states
to fashion correctives. 47 Undoubtedly, the court was formerly
content that Congress, being aware of the injustice which re-
sulted from the invalidation of state action by preemption, could
remedy the situation at will. However, Congress remained silent.
It is submitted that the Court grew impatient at the inaction of
Congress and, in order to prevent further injustice, deviated
from its former policy of mechanical application of preemption
principles in the field of labor relations.
Charley Quienalty
MINERAL LAW- PRESCRIPTION OF MINERAL LEASES
Plaintiff sued for cancellation of a mineral lease insofar as it
affected his property on the ground of prescription. The defend-
ants had not explored for minerals for a period in excess of ten
years. In 1941, plaintiff's vendor granted a mineral lease, cov-
ering some 19,000 acres on several non-contiguous tracts for a
44. See discussion in note 35 supra.
45. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Co., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
46. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Re-
lations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
47. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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primary term of ten years. In 1942, vendor sold to plaintiff a
40-acre tract which was subject to the mineral lease and retained
the mineral rights. The lease was unquestionably in force be-
yond its primary term as to the lands upon which there was
production. However, no drilling operations were ever conducted
on plaintiff's tract, which was non-contiguous to the producing
lands. The trial court gave judgment for plaintiff on the ground
that the mineral lease was prescribed as to plaintiff's tract by
ten years nonusage. The Supreme Court held, reversed. The ten-
year liberative prescription of mineral servitudes or real rights
does not apply to a mineral lease because mineral leases create
only personal rights.' R.S. 9:11052 did not have the effect of
changing mineral leases from a personal right into a real right.
Tate, Justice ad hoc, dissented for the reason that the juris-
prudence and public policy of this state are to the effect that
a landowner cannot retain control over the minerals beyond ten
years without user after he parts with the title to the surface.
Reagan v. Murphy, 105 So.2d 210 (La. 1958).1
The non-ownership theory is the foundation upon which Lou-
isiana mineral law developed. 4 Contracts granting mineral rights
only gave the right to search for and reduce to possession those
minerals which were found.5 These contracts were of three types:
sale,6 reservation, 7 or lease.8 Although the consideration differed
1. LA CIVIL CODE art. 3529 (1870) : "This prescription has also the effect of
releasing the owner of an estate from every species of real rights, to which the
property may have been subject, if the person in posssesion of the right has not
exercised it during the time required by law." Id. art. 3546: "The rights of
usufruct, use and habitation and servitudes are lost by non-use for ten years."
2. LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950) : "Oil, gas, and other mineral leases, and contracts
applying to and affecting these leases or the right to reduce oil, gas, or other
minerals to possession, together with the rights, privileges, and obligations re-
sulting therefrom, are classified as real rights and incorporeal immovable prop-
erty. They may be asserted, protected, and defended in the same manner as may
be the ownership or possession of other immovable property by the holder of these
rights, without the concurrence, joinder, or consent of the landowner, and without
impairment of rights of warranty, in any action or by any procedure available to
the owner of immovable property or land. This Section shall be considered as sub-
stantive as well as procedural so that the owners of oil, gas and other mineral
leases and contracts within the purpose of this Section shall have the benefit of all
laws relating to the owners of real rights in immovable property or real estate."
3. See also companion case, Jones v. Sun Oil Co., 105 So.2d 219 (La. 1958).
4. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922). The court held that there could be no separate mineral estate separate
from the land. It was stated that a reservation in an act of sale creates a real
right or servitude in favor of the grantors which is extinguished by non-user for
ten years.
5. Ibid.
6. Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923).
7. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
8. Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925).
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as to each,9 the right granted by a lease was the identical right
created by a sale or a reservation. 10 Sales or reservation of min-
erals have always been classified as servitudes,"' whereas for
many years mineral leases were treated under various classifica-
tions. The following are among the most notable statements
made during this period regarding the classification of mineral
leases: this type of contract, although a lease, was not subject to
the code provisions of ordinary leases ;12 such contracts partake
of the nature of both sale and lease, and they have features
which are not applicable to either;"3 mineral leases are immov-
ables 1 4 and cannot be established by parol evidence;15 a mineral
lease conveys only a real right or servitude ;16 it is well settled
that a lessee of two tracts under one lease cannot interrupt pre-
scription on one tract by drilling on the other tract.17 Perhaps
the most important case equating mineral leases with servitudes
or real rights was that of Arent v. Hunter."' The facts of that
case were indistinguishable from those of the instant case.' 9
There the court held that a mineral lease conveyed nothing more
than a servitude and was subject to the ten-year liberative pre-
scription. In 1936, the court went so far as to hold that "the
fact that an oil and gas lease is one of servitude is no longer a
9. In the sale of a servitude, the consideration received by the grantor is the
price, whereas in a lease, the lessor is interested in exploration and development.
See Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925).
10. See ibid.
11. Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So.2d 906 (1950).
12. Noble v. Plouf, 154 La. 429, 97 So. 599 (1923) ; Nabors Oil & Gas Co. v.
Louisiana Oil Refining Co., 151 La. 361, 398, 91 So. 765, 778 (1922) ("In that
respect the doctrine that an ordinary lessee, as of a house or farm, cannot dispute
the title of his lessor during the term of the lease, has no application to a contract
by which a person acquires mineral rights, in the form or name of a contract of
lease.") ; See also Powell v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 165 La. 490, 115 So. 667
(1928).
13. Cooke v. Gulf Refining Co., 135 La. 609, 65 So. 758 (1914) ; Rives v. Gulf
Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
14. Vander Sluys v. Finfrock, 158 La. 175, 103 So. 730 (1925) ; American Nat.
Bank v. Reclamation Oil Producing Ass'n, 156 La. 652, 101 So. 10 (1924).
15. Noble v. Plouf, 154 La. 429, 97 So. 599 (1923).
16. Exchange Nat. Bank v. Head, 155 La. 309, 99 So. 272 (1924).
17. Palmer Corporation v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1930). It was
stated that this rule would apply even though it (the lease) be included in the
same contract.
18. 171 La. 1059, 133 So. 157 (1931).
19. In Arent v. Hunter, the vendor had leased five non-contiguous tracts and
then sold the land, retaining the minerals. Subsequently, the vendor sold all the
minerals to a subsequent purchaser of the land except those on the five tracts
leased. There was drilling on one of the tracts. The landowner sued for cancella-
tion of the mineral rights and the lease on the grounds that the defendants were
slandering his title. The court in the instant case stated that Arent V. Hunter
clearly supported plaintiff's contention, but that it had been impliedly overruled
by Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
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debatable question in this state."20 Five months later in Gulf
Refining Co. v. Glassell,21 the court made an abrupt change in its
treatment of a mineral lease. Mineral leases were distinguished
from mineral servitudes and classed as personal rights subject to
the code provisions regulating ordinary leases. The Glassel de-
cision was criticized as upsetting a firmly established rule of
property to the effect that an oil and gas lease is a real right or
servitude.22 In response to the Glassell case the legislature passed
Act 205 of 1938 defining and classifying oil, gas, and other min-
eral leases as real rights and incorporeal immovable property.
23
When the act was attacked as a retroactive change in substantive
property law, the court upheld its constitutionality on the ground
that it was only a procedural remedy. 24 In 1950, the legislature
amended the act by adding this sentence:
"This act shall be considered as substantive as well as
procedural so that the owners of oil, gas and other mineral
leases and contracts within the purpose of this statute shall
have the benefit of all laws relating to the owners of real
rights in immovable property or real estate. '25
It was thought that there could be no doubt that the purpose of
the amendment was to classify a mineral lease as a real right or
immovable for all purposes.26
The instant case was the first since Arent v. Hunter2 7 to
consider whether mineral leases were subject to the ten-year
liberative prescription applicable to real rights or servitudes.
The court held that the 1950 amendment did not create substan-
tive real rights, and that therefore the ten-year prescription did
not apply. The court reasoned that the amendment only said that
mineral leases shall be considered as substantive, in order that
the owners of mineral leases shall have the benefit of real prop-
20. State ex rel. Bush v. United Gas Public Service Co., 185 La. 496, 169 So.
523 (1936).
21. 186 La. 190, 200, 171 So. 846, 849 (1936). It is interesting to note that
the court stated "that in every instance where the court had squarely before it
the juridical nature or proper legal classification of a mineral, oil, and gas lease
the conclusion was reached that it was a contract of letting and hiring, and there-
fore did not create a real right in the land, or right of servitude on the property."
There was no authority cited for this statement.
22. INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 37, 62 (Louisiana State University 1953).
23. Allison v. Maroun, 193 La. 286, 190 So. 408 (1939). The late Chief Justice
O'Niell stated that it is a matter of general knowledge that the cause which in-
duced the legislature to enact Act 205 was the Glassell decision.
24. Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940).
25. As amended, La. Acts 1950(2 E.S.) No. 6, § 1.
26. INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 37, 62 (Louisiana State University 1953).
27. 171 La. 1059, 133 So. 157 (1931).
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erty laws. Thus, it did not have the effect of changing the nature
of leases from personal contracts to real rights. The opinion
declared that the legislature could not have intended that a min-
eral lease created real rights, for it would have to be said that a
mineral lessee owns the right to explore for minerals. 2 The
court's reasoning here may lead one to wonder just what right is
owned by a mineral lessee if he does not own the right to search
for minerals. It would seem that he at least owns the right to
use the right of his lessor. In saying that because R.S. 9:1105
only classifies and considers mineral leases as real rights and
therefore does not create real rights, the court apparently did
not consider the fact that the Civil Code, in creating real rights,
uses the same language. Article 470 provides that incorporeal
things, consisting only in a right, are placed in classes of mov-
ables or immovables according to the object to which they ap-
ply.29 Article 471 provides that a servitude is considered as im-
movable from the object to which it applies.3 0 The Code also
states that not only servitudes, but leases and all other rights,
which the owner imposes on his land before alienating the soil,
form real obligations.3 1
Thus since a lease, like a servitude, forms a real obligation
on an immovable32 and the legislature has expressly classified
mineral leases as a real right and incorporeal immovable prop-
erty,33 it follows that the rules of real rights, including prescrip-
tion, should properly apply to a mineral lease.3 4 In holding that
28. 105 So.2d 210, 214 (La. 1958). For the reason that the same thing cannot
be owned by two people at the same time. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 494 (1870).
29. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 470 (1870) : "Incorporeal things, consisting only in a
right, are not of themselves strictly susceptible of the quality of movables or im-
movables; nevertheless they are placed in one or the other of these classes, accord-
ing to the object to which they apply and the rules hereinafter established."
30. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 471 (1870): "The following are considered as im-
movable from the object to which they apply:
"The usufruct and use of immovable things.
"A servitude established on an immovable estate.
"An action for the recovery of an immovable estate or an entire succession."
31. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2015 (1870) : "Not only servitudes, but leases and all
other rights, which the owner had imposed on his land before the alienation of the
soil, form real obligations which accompany it in the hands of the person who
acquires it, although he have made no stipulation on the subject, or they be not
mentioned in the act of transfer. The purchaser may, if the circumstances permit
it, have relief against the seller for concealment of such charges; but the law
establishes the rule that no one can transfer a greater right than he himself has,
except where the neglect of some formality required by law has subjected the owner
of the real incumbrance to a loss of his right, in favor of a creditor or bona fide
purchaser."
32. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2015 (1870).
33. LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950).
34. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 3529 (1870).
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R.S. 9:1105 did not subject mineral leases to the rules of pre-
scription applicable to real rights because the legislature only
classified and considered mineral leases as real rights, it is sub-
mitted the meanings of the words "classify" and "consider" were
ignored. To classify is to group or separate in classes those
things which have systematic relations. 5 To consider is to view,
regard, or judge, as in a certain relation.8 6 In classifying and
considering a thing as a real right, it must have been intended
that the system of rules relating to that class apply. Only part
of the statute was employed in reasoning that its purpose was
only to give mineral lessees the benefit of real property laws. It
seems reasonable that the legislature would have also intended
that anyone benefiting from the rights of real property laws
should also be subject to the obligations of such laws. Indeed,
the statute provides that the rights, privileges and obligations
of mineral leases are classified as real rights and immovable
property.
The practical effect of the decision could be more serious
than the technical criticisms of its rationale. Without consider-
ing the wisdom of the established public policy behind the non-
ownership theory, it is submitted that the effect may be to cause
a conflict with that policy. The non-ownership theory has as its
reason the view that control of mineral rights should not be sep-
arated from ownership of the soil for more than ten years with-
out user. 87 Under the holding in the present case, a landowner
could indefinitely separate the right to explore for minerals from
the ownership of the soil, even though that right is not exercised.
This could now be possible in situations such as the following.
A owns non-contiguous tracts 1, 2, and 3, and enters into a single
lease for a term of 99 years with a self-owned corporation pro-
viding for a 1/960th interest in production and a small delayed
rental. A sells to B tract 3 and retains a mineral servitude, which
subsequently prescribes in ten years. Either of three results
might follow: (a) Production occurs on tract 3 and B receives
only a 1/960th royalty, whereas he might have otherwise been
able to obtain a normal 1/8th royalty had he not been deprived
of his power to bargain. (b) During drilling or production on
tract 1, B is deprived of both rentals and royalties. (c) Assuming
that there is an "unless" clause in the lease, the mineral lessee
35. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 496 (2d ed. 1957).
36. Id. at 568.
37. Tate, J., dissenting opinion, 105 So.2d 214, 215 (La. 1958).
(Vol. XIX
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would not have to drill for 99 years, during which time B or his
successors would only be entitled to a small rental. It appears
from the above illustrations that those seeking to acquire or re-
tain an interest in minerals without being subject to the burden
of developing within ten years would prefer to obtain a lease
for 99 years.38 The practical effect is to discourage the use of
servitudes and virtually to circumvent the purpose of the non-
ownership theory.
While the decision seems incorrect insofar as it holds that
the ten-year prescription does not apply to mineral leases, the in-
stant case is technically correct insofar as it holds that the lease
was still in effect as to the plaintiff's tract. It was not necessary
to decide the applicability of the ten-year prescription because it
had no effect on the outcome of the case. Production on the
leased premises should have prevented the running of prescrip-
tion on the unused tracts.39 This would probably be so even
though the unused tracts were non-contiguous to the productive
lands due to the theory of indivisibility.40 But even the soundness
of this approach is subject to question for both theoretical and
policy reasons. 41
. 38. It is of no moment that a lessee has to pay yearly rentals. It is a simple
matter of mathematics to determine what the purchaser would have to pay for the
mineral rights and divide this figure over the life of the lease, with appropriate
adjustments relative to interest, etc.
39. Veeder v. Pan American Production Co., 205 La. 841, 18 So.2d 314 (1944).
40. Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947); Cochran v.
Gulf Refining Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916) ; Murray v. Barnhardt, 117 La.
1023, 42 So. 489 (1906).
41. Assuming that the production in the instant case had occurred on plain-
tiff's forty-acre tract, the theory of indivisibility would dictate that the lessee had
fulfilled his obligation in its entirety to drill or pay delay rentals on 19,281 acres.
The lessors of the remaining 19,241 acres would receive nothing. This is contrary
to the public policy of allowing a landowner's retention of control over the minerals
after he parts with title to the land surface beyond ten years without user.
(Tate, J., dissenting, 105 So.2d 210, 215). The only remedy left to the lessors of
the remaining tracts is to sue for nondevelopment. In such a case, if the obliga-
tion to drill is indivisible, the effect is to divide the obligation to pay royalties and
rentals. See Justice Hamiter's dissent in Ilunter v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 907,
31 So.2d 10, 15 (1947). There he stated that the lessee obligated itself to pay to
the lessor royalty on the basis of the entire acreage leased. A lease is a contract
with many clauses and one of these clauses is the obligation to drill. The mere fact
that the obligation to drill one well is indivisible does not make the land upon
which this obligation is to be performed or other obligations of the lease indivisible.
Murray v. Barnhardt, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906). What the lessor bargains
for is the full development of the entire acreage leased (see majority opinion, 105
So.2d 210, 214 (La. 1958), wherein it is stated that "it is the established juris-
prudence that full development of the property on which a mineral lease is given
is implicit in the lease contract") and not a portion of the land. The obligation
of the lessor will not be fulfilled in its entirety if he only delivers a part of the
land. It is submitted that the obligation of the lessee is likewise not fulfilled in
its entirety if he only explores or develops a part of the land.
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In addition to passing on the question of prescription un-
necessarily, the decision appears to be in conflict with the well-
established principles underlying Louisiana mineral law. It is
illogical to say that the very same right to explore for and pro-
duce minerals may be leased for more than ten years, without
exercise, but may not be sold for more than ten years, without
exercise. 42 Unless mineral leases are made subject to liberative
prescription, control of the minerals will be separated from the
ownership of the surface beyond ten years without user. This
result would be tantamount to establishing a system of separate
ownership of minerals and would be an obvious departure from
the established public policy of the non-ownership theory.
43
Earl E. Veron
PRICE DISCRIMINATION - GOOD FAITH MEETING OF COMPETITION
Standard Oil Company was selling gasoline to four large pur-
chasers in the Detroit area at a lower price than it was selling to
other purchasers in the same area. Because of this difference in
price the Federal Trade Commission, under authority of the
Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act, instituted
price discrimination proceedings against Standard. In spite of
defendant's offer to show that the price reductions were made in
good faith to meet competition, the Commission issued a cease
and desist order based solely upon proof of injury to competi-
tion.' The court of appeals affirmed.2 The Supreme Court, hold-
ing that a good faith meeting of competition was an absolute
defense, reversed and remanded for a finding on this issue.3 The
Commission then found the price reductions not to have been
made in good faith, but pursuant to a price system4 utilized to
meet unlawful competition. 5 The circuit court, on examination
42. DAGGETT, LOUiSIANA MINERAL RIGHTS 16 (rev. ed. 1949).
43. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
1. Matter of Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified by 43 F.T.C.
56 (1946).
2. Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
3. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
4. A price system is a sales setup designed to give, regularly, one purchaser or
group of purchasers the advantage of a lower price than that charged other pur-
chasers. Price systems have been held to be per se violations of the Robinson-
Patman Act. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 725 (1948) ; FTC v. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). See AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED
PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON°PATMAN ACT 96 (1950).
5. Matter of Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953).
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